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IN  TERROREM CLAUSES:  BROAD,  NARROW,
OR BOTH?
Evan J. Shaheen*
INTRODUCTION
In her 1867 novel, The Children of Mount Ida: And Other Stories, Lydia
Maria Child described a man struggling to mobilize his donkey.  The man
was at a loss.  Despite his best efforts in whipping the animal, it refused to
move.1  It was only after a neighbor hung turnips on a stick in front of the
donkey that he set off “on a brisk trot, in hopes of overtaking them.”2  Like
the man in the novel, modern estate planners have struggled to find a way to
“whip” potential contests to their clients’ plans without also providing a “tur-
nip.”  The response to this problem from the modern estate-planning com-
munity has predominantly been the use of an “in terrorem” or “no-contest”
clause.  Inherent in this strategy is the “carrot and stick” or “turnip and whip”
approach.3
While the idea of the “carrot and stick” seems simple in theory, in ter-
rorem clauses are governed by state law, with their application varying in large
part by jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, this Note seeks to identify some of the
broad principles on which many in terrorem clauses rely, while also delineating
several of the different state law approaches thereto.  It does this by describ-
ing some of the potential problems with in terrorem clauses and posing poten-
tial solutions in the context of a variety of state law jurisprudence.4
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Science in
Accountancy, The University of Louisville, 2018.  I would like to thank Professor Barry
Cushman for his guidance and support throughout the writing process.  I would also like
to thank my family, especially Mom, Dad, Sophie, Pam, Bob, Mitch and Shirley, for
encouraging me to set sail and follow my dreams, and my colleagues at Notre Dame Law
Review for their diligent edits.  All errors are my own.
1 LYDIA MARIA CHILD, THE CHILDREN OF MOUNT IDA, AND OTHER STORIES 156 (New
York, Charles S. Francis 1871).
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Kara Blanco & Rebecca E. Whitacre, The Carrot and Stick Approach: In Ter-
rorem Clauses in Texas Jurisprudence, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1127, 1128–29 (2011) (describing
the use of the “carrot and stick” approach).
4 Because of the expansive and varying nature of the law surrounding in terrorem
clauses, this Note does not seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of each state’s
approach to them or their applicability in every potential situation;  rather, it seeks to iden-
tify potential problems arising from some of the general principles surrounding such
clauses.
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This Note will first address what will be defined as the “puppet prob-
lem.”5  By drafting in terrorem provisions that purport to cut out only the con-
testant and not the contestant and his or her descendants, however, planners
expose their clients to the puppet problem.  There are many instances in
which a testator or settlor will amend his plan, leaving his grandson with
substantially less than in the previous plan, and omitting his son (the grand-
son’s father) from the amended plan completely.  The son still has standing
to contest the plan, but under the amended plan, nothing to lose.  Conse-
quently, the grandson can use the son as a “puppet” to contest the amended
plan in hopes of getting the original plan’s distribution reinstated, while also
avoiding forfeiture under the amended plan.  By drafting and permitting
provisions that preclude a distribution to the son and his descendants, planners
and judges can not only prevent the “puppet problem” but also make the
contestant think twice about a contest, even absent a substantial distribution.
On the basis that in terrorem clauses be enforced against contestants and
their descendants, this Note next argues that planners should take great care
to draft in terrorem clauses to ensure compliance with jurisprudence in the
state in which they practice.  In those states where the law is favorable to the
validity of in terrorem clauses, practitioners should offer them to their clients
routinely.  Even if there is no perceived “black sheep” who might contest the
will, clients may well opt for the deterrence benefits of the clause as it affects
all named beneficiaries.6  In today’s litigious society, adopting such precau-
tions may appeal to many clients.  In fact, they may choose to establish trusts
in jurisdictions favorable to upholding in terrorem clauses, either through the
use of a trustee situated in that state or by other means.7  In all cases, ensur-
ing that a client’s in terrorem clause complies with state law will be of even
greater importance as the clause purports to effectuate forfeiture of more
than just the contestant.
Finally, once planners and lawmakers have worked together to improve
in terrorem clauses in these ways, this Note maintains that their utility will
stretch to other nonprobate assets beyond wills and trusts.  Indeed, because
individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and insurance policies already purport
to preclude a distribution to a beneficiary for reasons such as undue influ-
ence or fraud of the policymaker, there is no reason that the same should not
apply for failed contests involving these assets.  The use of in terrorem clauses
with other nonprobate assets will consequently be a direct benefit of their
improved utility.
5 This is the traditional “carrot and stick” approach.
6 See Peter G. Billings, Note, Infants and In Terrorem Clauses: Rethinking New York Estate
Powers and Trusts Law Section 3-3.5, 22 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 397, 397–98 (2009) (“A com-
mon tool used to deter a will contest is an in terrorem clause.”).
7 Sullivan v. Kodsi, 836 N.E.2d 125, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“In determining where a
trust is administered . . . courts consider the provisions of the trust instrument, the resi-
dence of the trustees, the residence of its beneficiaries, the location of the trust assets, and
the location where the business of the trust is to be conducted.”).
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Part I of this Note thus describes the necessary background on which
arguments for in terrorem clauses stand.  Section II.A describes to whom in
terrorem clauses should apply to avoid the “puppet problem” and maximize
the effectiveness of the “carrot and stick” approach.  Section II.B focuses on
claims to which in terrorem clauses should apply in order to comport with
modern state jurisprudence.  Section II.C of this Note concludes with poten-
tial ways in which in terrorem clauses, when drafted effectively, can be useful to
planners in novel contexts, such as life insurance policies and IRAs.
I. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY AND POLICY OF IN TERROREM CLAUSES
Scholars regard estate planning as one of the oldest persisting areas of
the law today.8  The origin of wills likely precedes the idea of written commu-
nication.9  Because of this deep history, many of the practices of modern
estate planning, including the use of in terrorem clauses, originate from early
civilization.  It is therefore important to understand this history in order to
understand the modern issues around in terrorem clauses and how they can be
resolved.
Like estate-planning law generally, the use of in terrorem clauses dates
back as early as 2200 B.C.10  From that time, in terrorem clauses were used
consistently, often threatening that in the event of an alteration of the will in
question, “God’s grace and his eternal reward [would] be taken from him for
ever.”11  As evidenced by this clause, the influence of the Catholic Church
was heavily implicated in in terrorem clauses.  In fact, because of the Catholic
Church’s great interest in obtaining property during medieval times, church-
men prioritized the Church as a beneficiary in their wills.12  Seeking to
ensure protection of the succession of property to these institutions, testators
often invoked in terrorem clauses that make the modern in terrorem clause look
“tame.”13 In terrorem clauses continued to evolve under English rule.  Specifi-
cally, the unwieldy threats made applicable to any contestant in medieval
8 See Timothy W. Floyd et al., Beyond Chalk and Talk: The Law Classroom of the Future, 38
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 257, 293 (2011); Chad R. Baker, Ohio Estate Tax Repeal: The End or Just
the Beginning? Unlocking Opportunities After Repeal, 22 OHIO PROB. L.J., no. 2, 2011, at NL 6.
9 Floyd et al., supra note 8, at 293 n.201 (citing ALISON REPPY & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS,
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS, DESCENT AND DISTRIBU-
TION, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 2 (1928)).
10 Gerry W. Beyer et al., The Fine Art of Intimidating Disgruntled Beneficiaries with In Ter-
rorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REV. 225, 230–31 (1998).  Beyer et al. note that the use of in
terrorem clauses may have been invoked during biblical times, when God commanded to
Adam that “[f]rom every tree of the garden you may eat; but from the tree of the knowl-
edge of good and evil you must not eat; for the day you eat of it, you must die.” Id. at 230
(quoting Genesis 2:16–17).
11 Id. at 232.
12 Malcolm A. Moore, Lecture, The Origin of Our Species: Trust and Estate Lawyers and
How They Grew, 32 ACTEC J. 159, 160–61 (2006).
13 Id. (quoting an in terrorem clause that threatened to shut a contestant “out of the
gathering of all the holy ones on Doomsday; and [take him to] Satan”).
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times began to take on a more confined character.  In Powell v. Morgan,14 the
English High Court of Chancery refused to apply forfeiture of a bequest to a
contestant because the contest was made with probabilis causa litigandi (proba-
ble cause).15  The character of the clause changed as well.  Where threats of
satanic terror in the afterlife were thought to preclude contests in medieval
times, seventeenth-century provisions catered to a more materialistic society
by specifically threatening forfeiture of bequests.16  Centuries later, the
United States Supreme Court would weigh in on in terrorem clauses in Smithso-
nian Institution v. Meech.17  Writing on behalf of the Court, Justice David
Brewer distinguished between legacies given to persons “upon conditions not
to dispute the validity of, or the dispositions in wills or testaments,” which
were “in terrorem,” and cases in which the acquiescence of the legatee appears
to be a material ingredient in the gift, which “assume[d] the character of a
conditional limitation.”18  Citing Powell, Justice Brewer suggested that the
presence of “probabilis causa litigandi” with respect to the former of these will
result in the “non-observance of the conditions.”19  Justice Brewer went on to
suggest the reason for this limitation, explaining:
A court of equity does not consider that the testator meant such a clause to
determine his bounty, if the legatee resorted to such a tribunal to ascertain
doubtful rights under the will, or how far his other interests might be
affected by it; but merely to guard against vexatious litigation.20
The historical underpinnings briefly examined in these cases present
two prevalent themes that will appear in this Note.  First, as far back as Powell
in 1688, trust and estate law has been applying in terrorem clauses to a varying
number of claims.21  As this Note will illustrate, state laws continue to apply
14 Powell v. Morgan (1688) 23 Eng. Rep. 668, 668 (Ch.).
15 Id.; see also Robert M. Kincaid, Jr., In Terrorem Clauses and Arbitration Clauses in Wills
and Trusts in Ohio, 27 OHIO PROB. L.J., no. 1, 2016, at NL 2 (describing Powell as possibly
the first case regarding in terrorem clause enforceability).
16 See Cooke v. Turner (1846) 153 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1044; 15 M. & W. 727, 728 (permit-
ting a no-contest clause that sought to exclude any contestant of the will from the “use and
disposition hereinbefore contained, for the raising and payment, during the life of my said
daughter, . . . of the aforesaid yearly sum of £2000, . . . of the rents and issues and profits of
my estate hereinbefore devised, and also the liberty of residing in my said mansion-house,
and all other benefits hereby given to or in trust for my said daughter, or derivable by her
under this my will, and in lieu thereof I devise . . . the yearly sum of £300 only”).  This case
is thought to be one of the earliest decisions “declaring a forfeiture based upon a benefici-
ary’s post-testamentary conduct.”  Beyer et al., supra note 10, at 237.
17 169 U.S. 398 (1898).  The phrase in the will at issue in this case read: “These
bequests are all made upon the condition that the legatees acquiesce in this will and I
hereby bequeath the share or shares of any disputing this will to the residuary legatee
hereinafter named.” Id. at 399.
18 Id. at 413.
19 Id.
20 Id. (emphasis added).
21 While Powell refused to apply in terrorem clauses to claims brought with probable
clause, this Note examines several statutory schemes that refuse to apply in terrorem clauses
to other types of claims as well. See infra Section II.B.
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in terrorem clauses with such variation.  Second, as shown in the in terrorem
clauses at issue in the cases above, there was a change in what kind of “carrot”
testators were using to deter potential contestants.  With the societal shift
over time from a strong emphasis on religion toward a more materialistic
mindset, in terrorem clauses changed as well.  The threat of consequences in
the afterlife was no longer sufficient to deter contests.  Accordingly, testators
began to threaten deprivation of the bequest to the beneficiary upon the
occurrence of a contest.  This Note will argue that it is again time for a
change.  As family dynamics and relationships continue to rapidly evolve
throughout the twenty-first century, so too must the use of in terrorem clauses.
In today’s litigious society, planners should seek to use in terrorem clauses to
apply to the broadest number of claims permissible under the state law in
which they practice, thereby potentially minimizing the potential for future
litigation.22
Like many doctrines, the law of trusts and estates has built its foundation
not only on history but also on public policy.  While difficult to define, the
policies implicated to guide courts in making decisions about in terrorem
clauses should involve matters “that affect[ ] society at large rather than the
litigants’ purely personal or proprietary interests.”23  Moreover, while deter-
minations about public policy are ordinarily the province of the legislature,
the “courts may find something to be against public policy if it is ‘clearly
injurious to the interests of society.’”24  Courts consequently rely on a set
number of public policy considerations in determining the validity of an in
terrorem clause.  These considerations include a balancing of the interests of
the testator (including the primacy of the testator’s intent, minimization of
litigation, and practicality of the in terrorem clause) with the interests of the
beneficiary (such as avoiding the probate of wills procured by wrongdoing
and the law’s dislike for forfeitures).  Finding the proper balance of these
policy considerations is the main mechanism whereby courts decide the
proper form of in terrorem clauses.  This Note will analyze each in turn.
Although courts must strike a balance among the aforementioned policy
considerations, courts in numerous jurisdictions have articulated the neces-
sity of maintaining the primacy of the testator’s intent above all other consid-
erations.  After all, “[i]f the testator wanted [a certain testamentary scheme],
[the] testator would have used the appropriate language to reflect that inten-
tion.”25  Adopting a similar approach with respect to in terrorem clauses, the
court in Estate of Strader analyzed an in terrorem clause, giving primary defer-
22 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 267 (2020) (“[A] no contest clause that is extremely broad
evidences a purpose on the part of the settlor to expansively prohibit any attempt to set
aside any provision of a trust.”).
23 Tunstall v. Wells, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 474 (Ct. App. 2006).
24 Id. (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 236 P. 210, 212 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1925)).
25 Polen v. Baker, No. 99 CA 34, 2000 WL 776931, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2000)
(first and third alteration in original) (quoting the trial court opinion), aff’d, 752 N.E.2d
258 (Ohio 2001).
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ence to the testator’s intent.26  Specifically, “a court is required to strictly
construe [in terrorem clauses] and may not extend [them] beyond what was
plainly the testator’s intent.”27  This consideration will play a key role
throughout this Note in resolving issues related to the breadth of in terrorem
clauses today.
A related policy consideration often invoked by courts is the idea that in
terrorem clauses serve the purpose of deterring litigation from ever taking
place.  The court exemplified this reasoning in Tunstall v. Wells.28  There, the
court was confronted with an in terrorem clause that sought to preclude distri-
butions to all three of the testator’s daughters in the event that any one of
them contested the will.29  Upholding the in terrorem clause, the court first
focused on the testator’s intent—particularly, that the testator’s decision to
impose the in terrorem clause as a gloss on the terms of the daughters’ gifts
was within his right as a testator.30  It went on, however, to note that there is a
strong public policy in favor of using in terrorem clauses to avoid litigation.31
The court in Russell v. Wachovia Bank expounded on this sentiment, sug-
gesting that such deterrence seeks not only to avoid the inevitable financial
loss that accompanies litigation, but also to ensure a less contentious situa-
tion for the family.32  These views of in terrorem clauses as deterrent mecha-
nisms are important to the arguments this Note puts forth.  If it is true that in
terrorem clauses derive their effectiveness in part from their ability to prevent
litigation ex ante, then they should be used more frequently to apply to as
many claims as permissible under state law.  By taking this approach, plan-
ners can potentially avoid unforeseen problems that often arise in today’s
litigious society, particularly with respect to inheritances.
The final consideration within the realm of the testator’s interests is the
policy consideration of practicality.  As the copious amount of litigation over
in terrorem clauses has shown, every estate plan does not go uncontested.  One
approach to avoiding this requires that the testator leave a potential contest-
ant a substantial sum of assets in order to deter a contest.33  Absent such a
distribution, an in terrorem clause may “only create a false sense of security.”34
In certain situations, the testator is confronted with the difficult decision of
26 Grant v. Hixon (In re Estate of Strader), 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649 (Ct. App. 2003).
27 Id. at 653 (quoting Burch v. George, 866 P.2d 92, 96 (Cal. 1994) (in bank)).
28 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468 (Ct. App. 2006).
29 Id. at 469.  This Note addresses clauses similar to this one that purport to cut out
noncontesting beneficiaries as a result of a contest.
30 Id. at 474–75.
31 Id. at 475.
32 Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 633 S.E.2d 722, 725–26 (S.C. 2006).
33 Gus G. Tamborello, In Terrorem Clauses: Are They Still Terrifying?, 10 EST. PLAN. &
COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 63, 64 (2017) (“Under a standard scenario, the testator makes a
bequest to the beneficiary (although not always) and then inserts a clause which forces the
beneficiary to either accept the gift under the will or trust or to contest the instrument with
the hope of setting aside the testator’s intended disposition.”).
34 Wendy S. Goffe, Planning for Nontraditional Families 89 (June 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1867304.
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either choosing to omit the person who the testator has identified as being
potentially problematic at the time of the estate’s administration, or else giv-
ing him substantial assets in hopes of deterring his contest.35
Like most areas of the law, trust and estate law is a law of people.  This
means that courts are often faced with having to balance competing interests.
In addition to the abovementioned interests of the testator, courts must also
balance interests of beneficiaries with respect to in terrorem clauses.  Courts
first look to the public policy consideration of preventing the probate of wills
procured by wrongdoing.  Were the court to permit the probate of a will
procured only because of undue influence of the testator, it would in fact be
ratifying a document that does not reflect the testator’s intent.  In holding that
the broad in terrorem clause at issue was unenforceable concerning the plain-
tiff’s claims, the court in In re Estate of Singer explained the fine line between
giving effect to the testator’s intent and ensuring that an improperly pro-
cured will was not admitted to probate.36  Importantly, “[i]nterpreting the
clauses too broadly would frustrate the public policy of ensuring that wills are
genuine and valid before they are admitted to probate.”37  Thus, while the
testator’s intent must be given primary effect, it is important for planners to
draft these clauses to comport with state law.
In conjunction with the law’s effort to seek judicial affirmation that a will
was not wrongly procured, courts also interpret in terrorem clauses in light of
the law’s aversion to forfeitures.  With the threat of forfeiture looming in
every will contest involving an in terrorem clause, the courts carefully consider
this policy.  As in previous court decisions, in Rafalko v. Georgiadis the court
deferred to the policy consideration of avoiding forfeitures along with the
consideration of the testator’s intent.38  The combination of these policy con-
siderations thus requires that courts strictly construe in terrorem clauses.39
With the historical and policy foundations of in terrorem clauses estab-
lished, this Note now proceeds to discuss how these considerations can influ-
ence a further evolution in the modern landscape of in terrorem clauses.
35 But see Sarah C. Jenkins, How Testators Can Leverage Indiana’s Repeal of the Prohibition
on No Contest Clauses, RES GESTAE, May 2018, at 26, 28.
36 In re Estate of Singer, 920 N.E.2d 943, 947 (N.Y. 2009).
37 Id.
38 Rafalko v. Georgiadis, 777 S.E.2d 870, 875 (Va. 2015) (“When determining whether
a beneficiary’s actions have triggered a no contest clause, we strictly construe the language
of the clause because the drafter chose the language and forfeiture is disfavored in the
law.”).
39 See id.; see also Pihlajamaa v. Kaihlan (In re Estate of Kaila), 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865,
870 (Ct. App. 2001) (“Although no contest clauses are valid and favored by the public
policies of discouraging litigation and giving effect to the testator’s intent, they are also
disfavored by the policy against forfeitures and therefore are strictly construed and may not
extend beyond what plainly was the testator’s intent.”).
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II. BREADTH OF IN TERROREM CLAUSES TODAY
A. Breadth as to People Excluded Under In Terrorem Clauses
Despite the volume of caselaw providing an analysis of in terrorem clauses,
a considerable amount of confusion has persisted around applying them cor-
rectly.40  This is due in large part to the inconsistency with which courts bal-
ance the policy considerations discussed herein.41  The result of this
inconsistency is that courts often apply in terrorem clauses too broadly or too
narrowly.42  In reality, there are specific claims and specific people against
which in terrorem clauses should be applied.  While broad judicial application
of in terrorem clauses ensures that the clauses are effective in avoiding costly
litigation, there are other claims against which state courts will avoid applica-
tion in order to avoid the probate of a wrongfully procured will.43
For today’s practitioners and judiciary, there are two leading problems
with respect to maximizing the effectiveness of in terrorem clauses.  The first
problem, defined in this Note as the “puppet problem,” presents a common
fact pattern that several courts have managed to navigate by giving deference
to the policy considerations discussed above.  The second problem con-
fronted by practitioners is how to adequately deter certain classes of potential
contestants from bringing suit against a client’s estate plan without relying on
making substantial distributions to such people in certain cases.  In order to
avoid these problems, in terrorem clauses should be drafted and upheld
broadly in terms of whom they purport to exclude in the event of a failed
contest.
1. The Puppet Problem
The puppet problem is best exemplified in the related Wyoming cases of
Willey v. Willey44 and EGW v. First Federal Savings Bank of Sheridan.45  Both
cases arose out of the same facts.  Allen F. Willey created a revocable trust for
the benefit of his son, Spencer, as well as Spencer’s children at Allen’s
40 See 3 JOHN A. BORRON, JR., SIMES & SMITH: THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1518, at
604 (3d ed. 2004) (“There is much the same confusion of legal doctrine and of conclu-
sions found in the cases dealing with provisions which purport to forfeit the interest of a
beneficiary of a will or other dispositive instrument if he contests the validity of the instru-
ment as is found in the cases relating to restraints on marriage.”).
41 See id.; see also supra Part I (discussing policy considerations of in terrorem clauses).
42 See BORRON, supra note 40, § 1518, at 604 (“[D]ecisions tend to assume that the no-
contest provisions must be totally valid or totally void.”).  Such “all or nothing” application
of in terrorem clauses is illustrative of courts’ failure to consider adequately policy considera-
tions such as the law’s dislike of forfeitures and the testator’s intent.  As evidenced by the
testator’s use of the in terrorem clause at the outset, it is likely adverse to the testator’s intent
to completely invalidate the in terrorem clause as to all potential contests against the estate
plan.
43 Id.
44 2016 WY 116, 385 P.3d 290.
45 2018 WY 25, 413 P.3d 106.
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death.46  He subsequently amended his revocable trust, removing Spencer as
beneficiary and successor trustee and reducing the distribution Spencer’s
children were to receive.47  Allen also included an in terrorem clause in antici-
pation of litigation as a result of the amendments.48  Allen’s fears of litigation
were not fanciful.  Soon after the amendment, Spencer filed a complaint
alleging, among other things, that the trust amendments were the product of
undue influence.49  Subsequently, in EGW, Spencer’s children asked the
court to remove First Federal as successor trustee under the amended trust
and determine that the in terrorem clause, which disallowed Spencer and his
children from benefitting from the trust in the event of a failed contest, be
deemed void as against public policy.50  This fact pattern illustrates what the
results of the puppet problem would be in the absence of judicial acceptance
of a clause similar to Allen’s.  Similar to what occurred in Willey, Spencer’s
children, who retained their beneficial interest in the trust, would have been
able to utilize their father’s position to contest Allen’s trust, seeking the rein-
statement of their preferred trustee, with no risk of losing their interest.51
They did this because they believed the in terrorem clause to be against public
policy and thus void.52  In speaking to this issue for the first time, the Wyo-
46 Id. ¶ 3, 413 P.3d at 107.
47 Id. ¶ 4, 413 P.3d at 107–08.
48 See id. ¶ 5, 413 P.3d at at 108.  The language of Allen’s in terrorem clause maximizes
the effectiveness of the clause in modern trusts and estates law.  It read as follows:
It is my intention that the provisions of my Trust be honored and respected
without challenge from my son SPENCER WILLEY, from my grandchildren, from
my sisters or their children, or from anyone purportedly acting on behalf of any
of the foregoing.  Any challenge to this Trust made directly by or on behalf of my
son or grandchildren shall immediately terminate any interest in the Trust of any
descendant of mine[.]
Id. (alteration in original).  Such broad language is not uncommon in modern estate plan-
ning.  Benjamin M. Jakubowicz & John R. Cummins, Court Finds No Violation of Public Policy
Where Challenge to Trust Causes Minors to Forfeit Inheritance, BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL LLP
(Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2018/november/12/
court-finds-no-violation-of-public-policy-where-challenge-to-trust-causes-minors-to-forfeit.
The question remains, however, whether courts will always enforce such broad language.
An analysis of the caselaw on these clauses shows that their enforceability depends in part
on whether they are limited to a contestant’s descendants or to all beneficiaries. See infra
text accompanying note 72.
49 Willey, 2016 WY 116, ¶ 1, 385 P.3d at 293.
50 EGW, 2018 WY 25, ¶ 9, 413 P.3d at 108.
51 It might be argued that the use of broad language in Allen’s trust to apply to contes-
tants and their descendants did not solve the puppet problem in this instance since Spen-
cer’s children still brought suit.  This argument is without merit since the legitimacy of
such a clause at the time of the proceeding was completely unclear.  The Wyoming
Supreme Court concedes this in its opinion, suggesting that the validity of this provision
was a “matter of first impression for the Court.” Id. ¶ 20, 413 P.3d at 111.  This Note
proceeds on the notion that once courts begin to consistently enforce in terrorem provisions
against both the contestant and his or her descendants, claims similar to those brought by
Spencer’s children in EGW and Spencer individually in Willey will begin to dissipate.
52 Id. ¶ 9, 413 P.3d at 108.
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ming Supreme Court upheld the validity of Allen’s in terrorem provision on
public policy grounds.53  Writing for the court, Chief Justice Burke focused
on the primacy of the testator’s intent as the primary grounds for upholding
the in terrorem clause.  He reasoned that inherent in the idea that the testa-
tor’s intent should be a major consideration of public policy is the idea that
courts are often ill equipped to analyze complex family dynamics.54  Indeed,
a testator who knows that a contestant is likely to be beholden to the contest-
ant’s children will largely benefit from a clause like the one contained in
Allen’s trust.  In Tunstall v. Wells, a California court of appeals upheld a simi-
lar clause on the same rationale.55  Noting the fairness of upholding the
validity of such a broad clause, the court reasoned that the testator’s intent
was clear: he wanted to treat his daughters as a group.56  Similar to the rea-
soning in EGW, the court also cautioned against excessive judicial interfer-
ence with the clearly expressed intent of the testator, since the testator knows
more about the “internal dynamics and interrelationships within a family”
than does the court.57  Consistent with the primacy of the testator’s intent
and ensuring maximum practicality of in terrorem clauses, the court also reit-
erated the trial court’s concern with collusion.58  While the court did not
explicitly identify this as a “puppet problem,” its reasoning explains how such
a problem is solved through the clause at issue.  It noted that a clause that is
broad in terms of whom it purports to exclude “discourages collusion
between [potential contestants] to have one contest the Trust without plac-
ing the others’ gifts at risk.”59  As shown in EGW and Tunstall, in terrorem
clauses that seek to apply broadly in terms of who they exclude effectuate the
testator’s intent by eliminating the puppet problem, thus maximizing the
effect of in terrorem clauses in modern trusts and estates law.60
53 Id. ¶ 21, 413 P.3d at 112–13.
54 Id.
55 Tunstall v. Wells, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 469 (Ct. App. 2006).  This case involved an in
terrorem clause that sought to revoke a gift to all of the testator’s daughters if any one of
them contested the will. Id.  While this clause is beyond the boundaries this Note argues
should be observed, the court’s reasoning is still instructive.
56 Id. at 476.  The court deduces this conclusion from the fact that each daughter was
awarded an identical bequest. Id.
57 Id. at 475.
58 Id. at 476.
59 Id.  The court goes on to suggest that “even if the clause opens the possibility of
improper collusion between . . . [the] sister[s], it does not mandate or actively encourage
such impropriety.” Id.
60 It is difficult to fully illustrate the breadth of the puppet problem through a caselaw
analysis, since most contests in the realm of estate planning are resolved through private
settlement. See Nancy Mann Jackson, Where There’s a Will . . ., AARP  (Aug. 17, 2011),
https://www.aarp.org/money/estate-planning/info-08-2011/contesting-wills.html (quot-
ing a New York elder law attorney who settled every will contest in her career out of court).
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2. The New Carrot and Stick
A second problem often faced by modern planners is how to ensure that
potential contestants have an incentive not to contest the client’s estate plan.
The obvious solution would be to give a potential contestant an incentive not
to contest by ensuring that the client’s plan allows for them to receive a sub-
stantial distribution.  In situations where an in terrorem clause applies to all
named beneficiaries, there is no difficulty in providing such an incentive.
This approach might be problematic, however, where the testator’s will
would otherwise exclude a beneficiary, as the testator would be placed in the
position of having to give a substantial amount of assets to someone he would
otherwise omit from his plan, or else to omit the person, thus immunizing
such person from the threat of the in terrorem clause.  In these cases, such a
situation fails to give effect to the testator’s true intent, and the law should
thus find a more efficient resolution.61  A better solution to this problem
would be for planners to depend on an in terrorem clause that provides an
alternative incentive to the potential contestant to avoid a contest: broad
application of the in terrorem clause to the contestant’s descendants.  This
problem was presented to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in In re Hous-
ton’s Estate.62  The testator in that case provided that if his wife elected against
the will, his two sons would receive nothing.63  When the widow elected
against the will, the two sons filed exceptions, claiming that the provision was
against public policy.64  The court went on to discuss that the widow was
“faced with the unfortunate choice of receiving a small legacy or causing the
children to lose their bequests.”65  Similar to the reasoning in EGW and Tun-
stall, the court in In re Houston’s Estate upheld the provision on the basis that
the decision to place the widow in such a situation was a question of the
“wisdom of the testator.”66  While the widow in that case was undeterred by
the prospect of her sons losing their inheritance, the language invoked in the
instrument at issue is helpful in clarifying the instances in which the in ter-
rorem clauses advocated by this Note are most effective.  First, in certain cir-
cumstances, clients should be enabled to make smaller distributions to
potential contestants, similar to the distribution in In re Houston’s Estate.
Indeed, the necessity of providing substantial assets to a potential contestant
is not as great when there is an additional threat that both the contestant and
his or her descendants might suffer forfeiture.  Thus, a smaller distribution
of assets will be sufficient to deter many contests from the outset when used
in conjunction with such a clause.  Furthermore, this Note’s contention is
that in terrorem clauses should only apply to a contestant and the contestant’s
61 In these cases, the testator’s true intent is often to preclude a person they have
identified as a potential contestant from receiving an inheritance in the event of a failed
contest, while at the same time protecting their estate plan from contest at all.
62 89 A.2d 525, 526 (Pa. 1952).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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descendants.  This is because in most family settings, a person will be more
hesitant to deprive his descendants of their inheritance through a failed con-
test than someone to whom they are not related.  It follows that since the
contestant is in charge of otherwise financially providing for his descendants,
he would stand to benefit from a distribution to his descendants.  Based on
this reasoning, it is highly likely that the widow in In re Houston’s Estate chose
to elect against her husband’s estate with the intent of using the proceeds to
support her children.  In contrast, a properly applied in terrorem clause would
seek to disallow the widow and her descendants from benefitting from a contest
at all.67
3. Arguments Against These Clauses: Fairness to Beneficiaries
While the discussion of in terrorem clauses above may seem ideal for plan-
ners looking to ensure that the testator’s intent is preserved, these clauses
undoubtedly raise questions of fairness with respect to beneficiaries.  The
plaintiff in Succession of Kern raised similar arguments.68  The in terrorem
clause at issue in that case rendered the will’s distribution scheme null and
void for all beneficiaries in the event of a “challenge[ ] or protest[ ], in any
way by any heir.”69  The court held that this clause was invalid, as it rendered
the beneficiaries “virtually helpless and at the mercy of any heir not men-
tioned in the will.”70  The court went on, however, to distinguish an in ter-
rorem clause whose application was limited to legatees receiving a benefit
from the will.71  Legal scholars have also weighed in on similar clauses, argu-
ing that provisions that seek to omit all beneficiaries from receiving their
distributions under a will as a result of the failed contest of only one contest-
ant “encourage collusion between the party excluded and the party that
would benefit by the forfeiture.”72  These arguments provide a practical
boundary to this Note’s argument.  By limiting the breadth of in terrorem
clauses to application only to a contestant and the contestant’s descendants,
67 Spouses will often have remedies that likely circumvent the protection provided by
in terrorem clauses, namely, the elective share. See 1 FREDERICK K. HOOPS ET AL., FAMILY
ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE § 17:23 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2019) (“An in
terrorem clause is . . . ineffective to preclude a spouse’s assertion of his or her elective
share . . . .”).  While elective-share laws in many states will not usually permit a distribution
as sizable as a contest of the plan would, their intricacies are outside the scope of this Note.
See In re Estate of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2012) (“It is clear that the legislature . . .
intended to limit the property that would be included in the surviving spouse’s elective
share to the four categories of property specifically identified in the statute.”).
68 Succession of Kern, 252 So. 2d 507, 509 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
69 Id. at 510.
70 Id. (emphasis added).
71 Id. (“The provision in the will before us is particularly vicious since there is a third
party, not an heir, designated to reap the benefits of a protest or challenge ‘by any heir.’”).
72 Recent Cases, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 559, 574–76 (1949) (discussing Alper v. Alper, 60
A.2d 880 (N.J. Ch. 1948)). Alper involved an in terrorem clause that forfeited the shares of
all beneficiaries under the will in the event of a contest by any of the testator’s children or
named grandchildren. Alper, 60 A.2d 880.
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such clauses will fall within the Succession of Kern court’s zone of permissibil-
ity.  Moreover, the issues of collusion put forward by legal scholars are in fact
solved by in terrorem clauses that seek to preclude a contestant and the contest-
ant’s descendants from receiving their interests under a will.  It may well be
that a contestant would be undeterred by the prospect of causing a distant
relative or a perfect stranger to lose his inheritance.  To be sure, this overly
broad application of an in terrorem clause was at issue in Alper, the case that
legal scholars cite in favor of avoiding collusion.  This is less of an issue in the
context of the in terrorem clauses proposed in this Note because they would
only seek to preclude a contestant and the contestant’s descendants from
receiving a distribution.  A contestant will usually be more likely to consider
the potential disinheritance of his descendants than someone to whom he is
not related.  The in terrorem clauses advocated for in this Note further resolve
the problems of collusion by minimizing the puppet problem  The puppet
problem is most prevalent when the testator amends his initial estate plan,
excluding his child and providing for a smaller distribution to his grandchil-
dren (the descendants of said child) than they would have received under
the initial plan.  The problem under these circumstances is that the party
excluded (often the child of the testator) and the party who still has some-
thing to lose under the amended plan (the grandchildren of the testator)
may collude to use the testator’s child as a puppet to have their interest in
the initial plan reinstated.73  As illustrated, this problem is solved in most
instances by threatening the testator’s child with the risk of disinheriting his
own children as well.74
In conclusion, by drafting and enforcing in terrorem clauses that apply
broadly to a contestant and a contestant’s descendants, practitioners and
lawmakers can maximize the effectiveness of in terrorem clauses by minimizing
two major problems in trust and estate law today.75
73 It is true that under a theory of intestacy the child of the testator would take in
preference to the grandchildren of the testator.  As illustrated in EGW and Tunstall, how-
ever, the puppet problem often appears in the context of a will codicil or amended trust.
Thus, the “puppet” in these cases will most likely seek reinstatement of the original instru-
ment, not a dissolution of the entire plan resulting in intestacy.
74 Unlike most areas of the law, will and trust contests are often motivated not by
money but by emotion. See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests—An Empirical Study, 22
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607, 618 (1987) (“[Contestants’] prime motivation may not be
financial at all; instead, they may be motivated by a deeper psychological or emotional
need . . . .”).  Assuming that contestants often prioritize their emotions over money sup-
ports the idea that an emotional connection to someone’s descendants, unlike in Alper
where the children were not related to the widow, may cause a potential contestant to
abstain from bringing suit where the threat of loss of money might not.
75 As the prevalence of in terrorem clauses with language similar to that which this Note
suggests increases, it will become even more important for counsel representing a benefici-
ary or other potential contestant of an estate plan to pay close attention to what the in
terrorem clause purports to do. See Jakubowicz & Cummins, supra note 48 (“Any beneficiary
contemplating a contest to . . . a testamentary instrument containing an in terrorem clause
should review closely its operative terms before moving forward with such a contest or
challenge.”).
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B. Breadth as to Claims Excluded Under In Terrorem Clauses
As trusts and estates law moves to expand in terrorem clauses to apply to a
contestant and the contestant’s descendants, the stakes of any contest
undoubtedly will increase. In terrorem clauses will therefore need to be
drafted so as to ensure they apply to the claims permitted by the laws of the
planner’s state.
1. State Jurisprudence
Some states apply in terrorem clauses to a broad variety of claims.  Courts
in Washington, D.C.,76 and Ohio77 have explicitly rejected exceptions for
claims brought in good faith or with probable cause.  In addition, New
Hampshire adopted a similar law by statute.78  In states like Kentucky, “[t]he
validity of a clause providing that a legatee shall forfeit his interest if he con-
tests a will[ ] has been upheld in several decisions.”79  While such decisions
“seem inconclusive” as to whether in terrorem clauses apply to claims brought
in good faith or with probable cause,80 it is at least possible that Kentucky
would allow for a similar approach.81  The expansive nature of the law in
these states gives practitioners more flexibility in drafting, thus allowing them
to draft in terrorem clauses that apply to a broader variety of claims.
In contrast to these broad applications, other states take a more con-
fined approach by adopting various exceptions to the application of in ter-
rorem clauses.  The first variety of exceptions is exemplified in the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC).  The UPC’s approach sets forth the scheme adopted by
many states with respect to which claims an in terrorem clause should apply.82
UPC section 3-905 provides that “[a] provision in a will purporting to penal-
ize any interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceed-
76 Ackerman v. Genevieve Ackerman Family Tr., 908 A.2d 1200, 1203 (D.C. 2006)
(“[T]here is no exception to enforcement of a ‘no contest’ clause even when litigation is
brought in good faith and with probable cause . . . .”).
77 Modie v. Andrews, No. C.A. 21029, 2002 WL 31386482, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct.
23, 2002) (“[T]o recognize [an exception for probable cause or good faith] would in fact
destroy the rule itself . . . .” (quoting Bender v. Bateman, 168 N.E. 574, 575 (Ohio Ct. App.
1929))).
78 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:22(II) (West 2019) (“A no-contest provision shall be
enforceable according to the express terms of the no-contest provision without regard to
the presence or absence of probable cause for, or the beneficiary’s good or bad faith in,
taking the action that would justify the complete or partial forfeiture of the beneficiary’s
interest in the will under the terms of the no-contest provision.”).
79 2 NORVIE L. LAY & JAMES R. MERRITT, KENTUCKY PRACTICE: PROBATE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1179 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019) (citing Moorman v.
Louisville Tr. Co., 203 S.W. 856 (Ky. 1918)).
80 Id.
81 See T. Jack Challis & Howard M. Zaritsky, State Laws: No-Contest Clauses, AM. C. TR. &
EST. COUNS. 2 (Mar. 24, 2012) (listing Kentucky as a state that “enforce[s] no-contest
clauses without regard to probable cause or good faith”) https://www.actec.org/assets/1/
6/State_Laws_No_Contest_Clauses_-_Chart.pdf.
82 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-905 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2019).
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ings relating to the estate is unenforceable if probable cause exists for
instituting proceedings.”83  Such language has gained prominence within a
number of states.84  Thus by avoiding the application of an in terrorem clause
to any claim, and opting instead to apply them only to claims not made in
good faith, practitioners can ensure compliance with the relevant state laws.
Lawmakers in these states reason that this application of in terrorem clauses
fits better with the policy considerations of the primacy of the settlor’s inten-
tion and the interpretative purpose of the judiciary.  In South Norwalk Trust
Co. v. St. John,85 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut considered the
merits of avoiding application of an in terrorem clause to a claim made in
good faith.86  The court reasoned that by bringing a claim in good faith, the
contestant is assisting the court in its role as the judge of the testator’s
intent.87  Also considering the role of the court in will contests, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey viewed the legislature’s adoption of the “good faith”
exception to in terrorem clauses as “strongly influential in the judicial quest for
the important societal values which are constituent elements of the common
law,” even though the statute did not apply to the case before the court.88
Still, some lawmakers are hesitant to adopt this reasoning.  In his dissent in
Haynes v. First National State Bank of New Jersey, Justice Clifford argued that he
would have permitted the in terrorem clause at issue because a testator ought
to be able to manifest his intentions “without fear that a court will disregard
[them].”89  For lawmakers in these states, the difficulty with this line of rea-
soning is that it fails to consider when a court may intervene to ensure that
the testator’s intentions are truly being effectuated.90  By adopting such a
83 Id.
84 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.16.555 (West 2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2517
(2019); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-12-905 (West 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:3-905
(West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-905 (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-
413 (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3905 (West 2019); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.2-517 (West 2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-537 (West 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-24,103 (West 2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-47 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-
517 (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-20-05 (West 2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-
905 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-3-905 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-905 (West
2019); Parker v. Benoist, 160 So. 3d 198, 206 (Miss. 2015).
85 101 A. 961 (Conn. 1917).
86 Id. at 961–63.
87 Id. at 963; see also Tate v. Camp, 245 S.W. 839, 844 (Tenn. 1922) (“There will be no
more burden put upon the court in finding the fact of probable cause than in finding
similar facts in other classes of cases.”).
88 Haynes v. First Nat’l State Bank of N.J., 432 A.2d 890, 903–04 (N.J. 1981); see also
Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d 872, 879 (N.J. 1990) (“[C]ourts should seek to effectuate sound
public policy and mold the law to embody the societal values that are exemplified by such
public policy.”).
89 Haynes, 432 A.2d at 904–05 (Clifford, J., dissenting in part).
90 Justice Clifford subscribed to this reasoning, stating:
We may see [in terrorem] clauses as representing the most disagreeable impulses of
a testator.  They may lay bare one’s mean, uncharitable, impervious, suspicious,
hostile, downright churlish nature and then some.  I do not suggest that Mrs.
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view, courts fail to give effect to the policy consideration against the adminis-
tration of an instrument that has been wrongfully procured.91  As a result,
the best way to ensure that what appears to be the testator’s intent is in fact
such intent is to ensure that courts have a way to analyze the instrument at
issue, in lieu of “rubber stamping” every estate plan placed before them.  To
be sure, this Note does argue that the testator’s intent should be the primary
consideration of courts presented with an in terrorem clause.  However, the
reasons for the primacy listed above, including the fact that the testator has
the best knowledge of his or her family dynamics,92 lead courts in these juris-
dictions to the conclusion that as to claims brought in good faith, they have
discretion to determine whether the testator’s intent has been given effect.93
Another category of exceptions to in terrorem clauses is even more spe-
cific than the standard articulated by the Uniform Probate Code.  Evidently
seeking to eliminate unnecessary litigation from their courts, states like Dela-
ware, Texas, and California have specifically enumerated the claims to which
in terrorem clauses will not apply.  Delaware law provides that in terrorem
clauses do not apply to a variety of actions, including actions brought by trust-
ees, actions to determine whether a contest will be included within the mean-
ing of an in terrorem clause, and actions seeking judicial construction.94  On a
similar note, Texas law does not apply in terrorem clauses to construction pro-
ceedings but goes further in refusing to apply them in proceedings against a
fiduciary.95  California’s law is even more restrictive, applying in terrorem
clauses only to a contest brought without probable cause, a challenge to the
transfer of property based on a dispute of ownership of that property, and
the filing of a creditor’s claim.96  Similar to the laws that do not apply in
terrorem clauses to claims brought in good faith, these laws also illustrate the
necessity of specificity in drafting in many circumstances.
Several states take a different approach, refusing to apply an in terrorem
clause to claims brought by certain categories of plaintiffs.  In In re Shuster, a
guardian ad litem appeared on behalf of a person deemed “under disability”
Dutrow manifested any of those characteristics, but I do suggest that testators are
allowed to exhibit all of them, and worse, without fear that a court will disregard
their final wishes.
Id. at 905.  The issue for lawmakers in these states is that this argument assumes that mani-
festations within a will are in fact the final wishes of the testator and not those of an influ-
ential and opportunistic relative, which is not always the case.
91 See BORRON, supra note 40, § 1518.
92 See supra text accompanying note 57.
93 As an example, if a will was procured through undue influence, the document itself
may appear to reflect the testator’s intent.  Only through judicial interference allowing for
discovery would a wronged beneficiary be able to prove what the testator’s intent truly was.
By blindly enforcing in terrorem clauses, courts would preclude the beneficiary from being
able to do so.
94 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3329 (West 2019).
95 TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 254.005 (West 2019).
96 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21311(a) (West 2019).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-4\NDL412.txt unknown Seq: 17 23-APR-20 14:28
2020] I N T E R R O R E M  clauses :  broad,  narrow,  or  both? 1779
to contest the decedent’s will.97  The will at issue in that case had an in ter-
rorem clause that applied to “any ‘attempt to contest or oppose the probate or
validity of [the] [w]ill, or any [c]odicil thereto.’”98  Despite the broadly
drafted language of this clause, the court permitted the plaintiff to proceed
without applying the in terrorem clause.99  Similarly, in Bryant v. Tracy, the
minor-daughter from the decedent’s first marriage sought to contest the
decedent’s will, which provided that the decedent’s second wife was to
receive the bulk of his estate.100  In permitting the minor-daughter to pro-
ceed with the contest by way of a guardian ad litem, the court reasoned that a
forfeiture should not apply in the event of the contest’s failure.101  Support
for these decisions is reflected in at least one trusts and estates practice com-
mentary.102  In short, this policy is viewed as reflective of the rights of infants
and the disabled.103  Furthermore, those using a guardian ad litem “ma[ke]
no contest, nor authorize[ ] or direct[ ] any as a matter of fact.”104  The con-
test is that of another acting under no authority delegated by the infant or
person under disability, but under the authority and direction of the law.105
The most expansive category of in terrorem exceptions exists only in Flor-
ida, which does not permit the use of in terrorem clauses at all.106  Until
recently, Indiana maintained a similar system, providing that “any clause
‘that provides, or has the effect of providing, that a beneficiary forfeits a ben-
efit from the trust [or will] if the beneficiary contests the trust [or will] is
void.’”107  In July 2018, the Indiana General Assembly changed course,
amending the state code to permit the use of an in terrorem clause under
certain circumstances.108
2. Solution to Risks of Increased Litigation: What Planners Can Do
In lieu of overly broad or overly narrow drafting techniques, practition-
ers should adopt a method of drafting that best comports with the respective
97 In re Shuster, 710 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384–85 (App. Div. 2000).
98 Id. at 384.
99 Id. at 385.
100 Bryant v. Tracy, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 183, 185–86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891).
101 Id. at 185, 192.
102 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TR. LAW § 3-3.5 practice cmt. (McKinney 2019).
103 See id. But see In re Estate of Cagney, 720 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Sur. Ct. 2001), aff’d, 293
A.D.2d 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (applying an in terrorem clause against a minor whose
guardian ad litem bargained away his rights to contest his grandparents’ will).
104 Bryant, 27 Abb. N. Cas. at 192.
105 Id.
106 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 2019) (“A provision in a will purporting to
penalize any interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings
relating to the estate is unenforceable.”).  This Note does not argue in favor of laws as
expansive as Florida’s.  Rather, it focuses on ways to tailor in terrorem clauses to a client’s
situation to maximize the effectiveness of the clause.
107 See Jenkins, supra note 35, at 26 (alterations in original) (quoting IND. CODE § 30-4-
2.1-3 (2003) (amended 2018)).
108 See IND. CODE § 29-1-6-2 (West 2020).
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state laws above.  This method requires practitioners to understand the types
of claims that their respective states are adopting and to draft in terrorem
clauses accordingly.  One way planners can maximize the effectiveness of an
in terrorem clause would be to establish a trust in any of the jurisdictions
upholding in terrorem clauses against a broad number of claims, either
through the use of a trustee situated in that state or by other means.
By drafting in terrorem clauses in accordance with the laws of the states
referenced above, practitioners also give the testator and any potential con-
testants a better idea of the security mechanism protecting the plan.  Further-
more, as the law around in terrorem clauses moves to preclude a contestant
and his or her descendants from recovering in the event of a failed contest,
the stakes for in terrorem clauses to comport with state law will be even higher
than before.
C. Breadth as to Where In Terrorem Clauses Are Used
As lawmakers and practitioners begin to work together to effect the
changes above to make in terrorem clauses more effective, the demand for
them will be higher and stretch into other nonprobate areas.  Questions sur-
rounding such extension have recently been proffered by trusts and estates
lawyers, but there has yet to be any authoritative ruling in favor of or against
the practice.109
1. Judicial Embrace of Expansion of In Terrorem Clauses to Nonprobate
Instruments
Despite this absence of authority, there are meritorious policy and prac-
tical arguments for the use of in terrorem clauses in this way, particularly as
planners aim to avoid probate for both high- and low-wealth clients.110  The
use of in terrorem clauses in nonprobate assets is not completely unsettled.  In
Keener v. Keener, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed a question of first
impression: whether a no-contest clause in a will legally operates the same as
in a trust.111  In holding that there was no difference in application between
the two instruments, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause the testator relied
on the trust for the disposition of his property, . . . it [was] appropriate to
give full effect to [the] no-contest provisions in such trusts for the same rea-
sons that support the enforcement of such provisions when they appear in
109 See Morris A. Baldinger, Posting to Thread: IRA Beneficiary Form-No Contest Clause,
INTERACTIVE LEGAL (Aug. 21, 2019, 4:59 PM) (on file with author) (“Is it possible to subject
a beneficiary designation to an in terrorem clause?”).
110 See Russell N. James III, The New Statistics of Estate Planning: Lifetime and Post-Mortem
Wills, Trusts, and Charitable Planning, 8 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 1, 26 (2015)
(“[T]he 55+ population is shifting away from probate planning, with wealthier people shift-
ing toward funded trust planning and the less wealthy shifting toward non-probate transfer
titling.  Although no data for the use of non-probate transfer titling is available in this
dataset, it is reasonable to speculate that the less wealthy may be more likely to use such
relatively simple and easy devices as a means to avoid probate.” (footnote omitted)).
111 Keener v. Keener, 682 S.E.2d 545, 545 (Va. 2009).
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wills.”112  As reflected by this ruling, courts are not hesitant to apply the same
principles of in terrorem clauses in wills to trusts, which are nonprobate instru-
ments.  On this reasoning, there is little impediment to extending in terrorem
clauses to other nonprobate instruments like life insurance or IRA benefici-
ary designation forms.
2. Practitioner Embrace of Expansion of In Terrorem Clauses to
Nonprobate Instruments
In addition to judicial support for the use of in terrorem clauses to apply
to nonprobate assets, practitioners are beginning to draft in terrorem clauses
in contemplation of their expanding use.  In In re Marriage of Lund, a Califor-
nia court of appeals was presented with a will that provided the following
language in the section of the instrument related to its in terrorem clause:
For these purposes, my Estate Plan or Dispositive Plan includes but are not
limited to this my Last Will and Testament, including all Codicils, my and my
spouse’s Trust, Agreement, any amendment, any amendment and restate-
ment thereto, any lifetime gifts or transmutations, and any designation of bene-
ficiary executed by me with respect to any and all life insurance policies, employee
benefit plans, IRA’s or other contractual arrangements.113
Practically, this language reflects a potential way in which testators could
draft their in terrorem clauses to apply to their nonprobate assets.  The next
step, however, is determining the best mechanism for enforcement of this
clause in the event of a contest.
3. Enforcement of Expanded In Terrorem Clauses in Nonprobate
Instruments
The most practical way in which in terrorem clauses pertaining to nonpro-
bate assets could be enforced in the event of an unsuccessful contest is by
state courts.
While the enforcement of in terrorem clauses in IRAs and life insurance
policies by financial intermediaries appears theoretically possible, it is well
known that corporate entities are often change averse.114  Accordingly, the
enforcement of in terrorem clauses in nonprobate instruments will likely be
112 Id. at 548.
113 In re Marriage of Lund, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 84, 91 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added).
The issue before the court concerned a marriage dissolution proceeding. Id. at 88.  Conse-
quently, the court failed to consider whether the language in the in terrorem clause was
valid.  This case is referenced only as an example that practitioners are wary of the
expanding nature of in terrorem clauses.
114 See Michael J. Thacker, Take a Walk in Our Shoes: How Ohio Trustees Can Cope with the
Proposed Uniform Principal and Income Act, 12 OHIO PROB. L.J. 9 (2001) (“Corporate trustees
have been somewhat hesitant to embrace [a new Ohio law] . . . because they are concerned
about liability . . . .”).
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the province of the judicial system.115  Matters related to forfeitures of bene-
ficiaries with respect to these types of assets are not new to most courts.  In
SunTrust Bank v. Harper, a Georgia court of appeals was presented with a
challenge to a change of beneficiary of an IRA.116  The court ultimately
determined that the policyholder did not have the capacity to effectuate the
change of beneficiary form.117  As a result, the beneficiary under the most
recent beneficiary designation form suffered a forfeiture, as the proceeds
went to the original beneficiary of the policy.118  Where the court’s decision
in that case resulted in the beneficiary’s forfeiture because the plan was
determined to be invalid, it is equally plausible that a court could have given
effect to a theoretical in terrorem clause for the policy if the challenging bene-
ficiary’s claim had not been successful.  Some courts have gone even further
than using the threat of forfeiture to deter contests.  In Harrison v. Provident
Relief Association, a Virginia court of appeals upheld the validity of a clause in
an insurance policy that prevents any contest of the policy.119  The court rea-
soned that provisions “abounding in forfeitures . . . should be strictly con-
strued against the insurer, and liberally in favor of the insured.”120  Such
reasoning sounds synonymously in the policy consideration that courts pri-
oritize most in upholding in terrorem clauses in wills and trusts: construing
instruments in favor of the testator’s intent.121  The prospect of using in ter-
rorem clauses in lieu of these “incontestable clauses” would be more effective
in giving effect to the intent of the decedent, because they do not foreclose
the idea of permitting judicial interpretation in the event of a potentially
problematic instrument.122
The ideal solution to the expanding use of in terrorem clauses as a result
of their increased effectiveness is to enable testators to draft in terrorem
clauses to apply to nonprobate assets like life insurance policies and IRAs.  In
doing so, they will be able to depend on the courts to ensure the enforce-
ment of these clauses as they would in the context of a will or trust.
CONCLUSION
Few areas of the law are as versatile as the law of trusts and estates.  In a
practice that seeks to effectuate the testator’s intent above all, trusts and
115 This is the same as the enforcement of in terrorem clauses in wills and trusts, which
depends on judicial interpretation to give effect to forfeitures in the event of an unsuccess-
ful contest.
116 SunTrust Bank v. Harper, 551 S.E.2d 419, 423 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
117 Id. at 426.
118 Id. at 425.
119 Harrison v. Provident Relief Ass’n, 126 S.E. 696, 700 (Va. Ct. App. 1925).  Such a
clause should be contrasted with an in terrorem clause, which permits a contest but triggers a
forfeiture in the event that the contest is unsuccessful.
120 Id. (quoting Stratton’s Adm’r v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.E. 636, 640 (Va. 1913)).
121 See supra text accompanying note 25.
122 This Note argues that judicial interpretation can be used to bolster the intent of the
testator. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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estates lawyers must find ways to adapt to what their clients want.  No estate
plan can therefore guarantee a successful defense against all claimants or
claims.  This is particularly true in light of the increasingly unique family
dynamics of the twenty-first century.
The law of trusts and estates can however seek out certain practices that
ensure that most testators will be adequately protected after their deaths.  For
years, in terrorem clauses have been the primary mechanism whereby testators
protected themselves from problematic family members or disgruntled bene-
ficiaries.  To date, these clauses have yet to achieve their full potential.
Problems with coercive relatives and forced financial incentives have limited
their effectiveness in traditional estate-planning mechanisms and other,
more modern instruments.  By addressing these problems through principles
derived from history and public policy, practitioners and courts can properly
tailor in terrorem clauses to the appropriate claims.  In doing so, they enable
the expansion of in terrorem clauses to a variety of nonprobate assets.  Practi-
tioners have developed effective provisions to eliminate the puppet problem
in more recent times.  And as the wealth of the baby boomer generation is
transmitted to the next generation, we can expect to see more widespread
use of in terrorem clauses, in large part to discourage all of the beneficiaries
from contesting the will or trust and to thereby avoid the rising tide of family
litigation sweeping the country.
This Note has thus suggested ways to address the problems that exist
with in terrorem clauses, thereby making them more effective.  Specifically,
planners can address problems with the kind of people to which in terrorem
clauses apply by applying them to a contestant and the contestant’s descend-
ants.  Once such a scheme is in effect, the increase in those potentially suffer-
ing forfeiture will make it even more important for practitioners to draft in
terrorem clauses to comply with the laws of the state in which they practice.
Finally, with the increase in effectiveness in in terrorem clauses which will
arise from their application to a contestant and the contestant’s descendants
and their compliance with state law, their utility will most effectively spread
into other nonprobate assets, namely, IRAs and life insurance policies.
There is no doubt that the quest to find the proper turnip to make bene-
ficiaries think twice before contesting an estate plan has not been without its
problems, but the adoption of the aforementioned changes will make such
efforts substantially less turbulent going forward.
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